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Dangers exist in both maximalist approaches to deterrence and minimalist
ones. A minimal sufficiency strategy aims to avert these dangers. The
objectives are to convince people that the webs of relationships within which
they live mean that lawbreaking will ultimately lead to desistance and remorse
and to persuading offenders that predatory crime is simply wrong. Alternative
support and control strategies should be attempted until desistance finally
occurs. Communities can be helped to understand that this is how minimally
sufficient deterrence works. By relying on layered strategies, this approach
takes deterrence theory onto the terrain of complexity theory. It integrates
approaches based on social support and recovery capital, dynamic concen-
tration of deterrence, restorative justice, shame and pride management, re-
sponsive regulation, responsivity, indirect reciprocity, and incapacitation.
Deterrence fails when it rejects complexity in favor of simple theories such as
rational choice.
Some criminologists are inclined to question why any role should be given
to deterrent crime prevention strategies. The evidence for the power of
deterrence in reducing crime is thin, after all (Nagin 2013; Chalfin and
McCrary 2017; Tonry 2018). There are three reasons why deterrence
should have a role. One is that a good meta-strategy for crime control
achieves strength through the convergence of weaknesses: deterrence
can help to motivate crime control strategies that are more effective thanElectronically published February 27, 2018
John Braithwaite is Distinguished Professor and founder of the Regulatory Institutions
Network, Australian National University.
q 2018 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0192-3234/2018/0047-0006$10.00
69
This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
70 John Braithwaite
Alldeterrence. Second, deterrence is a weak strategy that can be tried after
various somewhat less weak strategies have failed, strengthening the ef-
ficacy of a complex approach tied together as a bricolage of strategies.
Third, when deterrence of a specific offender fails, it might slightly
strengthen general deterrence of other offenders. Sometimes punish-
ment or the threat of punishment provokes defiant reactions that can
make crime more likely, not less. For most values of relevant variables,
defiance effects exceed deterrence, but there are some contexts in which
specific deterrence exceeds defiance. For these reasons, I reject deter-
rence minimalism in favor of minimally sufficient deterrence.
Deterrence maximalism has even less appeal. Zero tolerance and other
political slogans of deterrence maximalism are common, doubtless help-
ful in election campaigns, but are dismissed by scholars who understand
the evidence. Deterrence is not the main game of crime control. Even so,
it is reckless to fail to develop a coherent view of the constructive role de-
terrence must have in crime prevention. A transdisciplinary scientific
consensus about the limits of deterrence is behind growing support for
“less prison, more police, less crime” as a prescription grounded in pre-
ventive capacities of evidence-based policing (Durlauf and Nagin 2011;
Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). In light of the data on the limited
effectiveness of deterrence and the cost of building prisons, it is impera-
tive to advocate massive disinvestment from putting people in them.
Likewise, it is easy to dismiss maximizing the shame aimed at offenders,
even though shame has a role in minimally sufficient deterrence. Some
criminologists conclude that there is strong evidence that shame has power
in crime control (Braithwaite 1989), but they do not advocate maximizing
the shame directed at offenders. Persuasive evidence shows that this strat-
egy leads to stigmatization, which makes crime worse (Ahmed et al. 2001,
pp. 3–72).
Moreover, we know that healthy pride management may be as impor-
tant as, or more important than, healthy shame management (Maruna
2001; Ahmed and Braithwaite 2011; Best 2017). Intentionally directing
unhealthy shame at offenders may crowd healthy pride out. There is un-
healthy shame that increases crime and healthy shame acknowledgment
that helps prevent crime and repair harms. Likewise, there is unhealthy
pride that fosters crime by vaunting superiority over others and humble
pride in doing things well with others that is vital to crime prevention
via pride in the identity of being a law-abiding citizen who cares about
the suffering of others (Ahmed and Braithwaite 2011). Deterrence doesThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allbest when it does not crowd out healthy shame acknowledgment and
healthy pride in a law-abiding self. A virtue of minimally sufficient de-
terrence is that it minimizes that stigmatic crowding out that is inherent
in deterrence maximalism.
Progressives who seek to minimize the quantum of fear or shame that
criminal justice system processes invoke are also a danger. It is dangerous,
for example, to conceive restorative justice as an abolitionist prescription
that eliminates the need for punishment and deterrence. Restorative jus-
tice is a strategy that gives an opportunity to all the stakeholders in a
crime to participate in a process that discusses who has been harmed or
has needs, and what might be done to repair those harms and meet their
needs (Zehr 2015). Because crime hurts, justice should heal. Restorative
justice conceived as eliminating the need for deterrence is denial of the
reality that if we gave criminal offenders the choice of either restorative
justice processes in which they agree to repair the harm they caused or do-
ing nothing and forgetting about it, most would opt to forget it. Offenders
agree to participate in restorative justice because the alternative has deter-
rent elements. We see from this that a useful role for deterrence is that it
motivates engagement with something that is more effective than deter-
rence: restorative justice and the rehabilitative and preventive measures
for which restorative justice is a delivery vehicle. Indeed, wise integration
of restorative justice, rehabilitation, and deterrence allows restorative
justice to strengthen the preventive power of deterrence, in addition to
allowing deterrence to strengthen restorative justice and rehabilitation.
The ambition is to identify a good meta-strategy for crime control that
achieves strengths from the convergence of weaknesses: in this example,
weaknesses of both deterrence and restorative justice. Some restorative
justice advocates are minimalists about shame (e.g., Maxwell and Morris
2002). A society in which rape and violence are minimally shameful will
be a society with high rates of rape and violence (Braithwaite 1989, 1995).
Hence, it is imperative to diagnose what aminimal sufficiency of the right
kind of shame might mean.
Minimum deterrence and minimum shame are inferior to minimal
sufficiency: just enough of the right kinds of deterrence and shame is
needed. Deterrence and shaming aremore effective when combined with
a dynamic theory of social support. Communicating the shamefulness of
predatory crime is more effective when combined with reintegration of
offenders—reintegrative shaming. As with deterring crime, deterring
warfare works better when armed fighters are simultaneously shown theThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allcosts of killing and shown a supportive peace dividend that benefits them,
their family, and their community (Toft 2010; Braithwaite and D’Costa
2018, chap. 3). This is why there is strong evidence that armed peace-
keepers prevent war when they do multidimensional peace building that
supportively delivers peace dividends (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna
2008; Call 2012). It is also why simplistic strategies of deterrence maxi-
malismby threatening foes with acceleratingmilitary investment can cause
more war.
Criminological theory needs something better than cynicism driven by
piling up empirical studies about limits of deterrence. Few citizens think
deterrence has no role to play in the prevention of rape, theft, or corpo-
rate crime. In failing to develop a theory of deterrence that takes fear and
shame seriously in social control, criminologists have handed the deter-
rence debate to maximalists.
This is sad because deterrence maximalists justify a greatly increased
level of suffering for incarcerated people and their families. Maximalism
increases crime by skewing government budgets to prisons that worsen
the criminality of those sentenced to them (Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson
2009). Yet maximalists make more sense to the community than crimi-
nologists who say only that punishment deters little. One way of conceiv-
ing the imperative to take deterrence seriously, even if minimally, is that
deterrence underwrites the greatest historical accomplishment of the jus-
tice system. Eisner (2003, p. 126) revealed sharply falling homicide rates
between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries across Europe, the period
when some European states institutionalized courts to “discipline” vio-
lence. The capability of the courts in the eyes of citizens to deter violence
was one reason they abandoned the private deterrence of blood feuds,
thereby greatly reducing homicides (Pinker 2011).
A minimal sufficiency strategy of punishment can increase the power
of deterrence theory in crime prevention substantially if its empirical
claims are more strongly verified by future research and if it can win the
political debate against maximalists. It can increase the power of deterrence
with a policy that experiences release of the majority of prisoners even in
the societies with the lowest imprisonment rates. Minimal sufficiency’s
claims are consistent with the rather limited existing evidence.
My aim here is to develop ideas toward a theory of minimally suffi-
cient deterrence and to reflect on that existing evidence. To do that, I
discuss seven interwoven principles of a crime prevention meta-strategy
for minimally sufficient deterrence:This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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All1. Escalate enforcement. Display intent to progressively escalate a re-
sponsive enforcement pyramid that involves progressive escalation
of sanctions for wrongdoing and support for social responsibility.
2. Inexorability. Pursue inexorable consistency of detection of pred-
atory crime. Communicate inexorable community commitment
to stick with social support for those struggling with problems
of lawbreaking until the problems are fixed.
3. Escalate social support. With repeated offending, increase social
support. Even when there is escalation to a last resort of severe in-
capacitation, escalate social support further. Keep escalating social
support until desistance is consolidated.
4. Sharpen the Sword of Damocles. Cultivate the perception that
“Trouble hangs inexorably over my head; they want to support
me to avert it.”
5. Dynamic concentration of deterrence. Focus deterrence on lines
that should never be crossed after an announcement date. Then
progressively lift that line, raising our expectations of socially re-
sponsible citizens.
6. Community engagement. Engage the community with offenders
in widening restorative conversations that educate in the shame-
fulness of criminal predation for the many who participate in the
conversations. Avert stigmatization.
7. Modesty. Settle for the modest general deterrence delivered by
this shamefulness and a minimal number of cases that escalate to-
ward the peak of the enforcement pyramid.
In this essay, I first explain the idea of the responsive regulatory pyr-
amid. It provides a scaffolding into which to insert all seven principles.
Readers versed in the literature of restorative justice and responsive reg-
ulation may find much of the pyramid discussion familiar; I elaborate it
for the benefit of others. I then explain the importance of inexorable re-
sponse, then the theory of dynamic deterrence and defiance, and then
how to constitute the shamefulness of the curriculum of crimes. I con-
clude with minimally sufficient general deterrence.I. The Regulatory Pyramid
The regulatory pyramid is a meta-strategy of regulation, a strategy for
how to sequence strategies (Braithwaite 2008). It is relevant to regulat-This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Alling crime by organizations or individuals. Figure 1 is an example of a
regulatory pyramid elaborated in the next section. The presumptive
strategy (a presumption that can be overruled) is to start at the base of
the pyramid and escalate slowly. This is a strategy for keeping the Sword
of Damocles sharp by making it rare to reach the pointy end of the pyr-
amid. I discuss the rationale for keeping the Sword of Damocles sharpFIG. 1.—Responsive pyramid model incorporating minimally sufficient deterrenceThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allin a later section. Consistent with the limited evidence on what works
with corporate crime enforcement (Schell-Busey et al. 2016), this is a
strategy that provides a wide mix of regulatory options before measures
are reached that risk blunting the Sword of Damocles. At the bottom of
the pyramid are restorative strategies that provide support to offenders
and victims, meet needs, and repair harms.
Responsive regulatory theory says that we should first look to the
strengths of a lawbreaker and then seek to expand them.Mental health re-
searchers led in showing that training in building on strengths improves
quality of life and vocational and educational outcomes (Stanard 1999).
When those outcomes are improved, recent econometric findings show
more clearly than in the past that unemployment can be averted, that this
reduces crime, and that wages for the poor can be increased, reducing
crime by increasing the attractiveness of legitimate work compared to
illegitimate work (Chalfin and McCrary 2017, pp. 33–35). This path
to crime reduction is resource intensive, though less so than a massive
prison system, and it is a benefit to the economy in contrast to the eco-
nomic deadweight of many large prisons. The idea is to absorb weak-
nesses by expanding strengths. Put another way, regulators should not
rush to law enforcement solutions before considering a range of restor-
ative approaches that can be delivery vehicles for capacity building. As
some regulated actors see their strengths expand to levels not previously
conceived to be possible, regulators celebrate their innovation, publi-
cize it, and support its extension. With corporate enforcement, research
grants and prizes for rolling out new approaches that take internal com-
pliance systems up through new ceilings for that industry offer an exam-
ple. An example involving young black men in Minneapolis is use of cel-
ebration circles in which victims join with the offender’s loved ones to
celebrate the way an offender has repaired the harm, righted the wrong,
and turned his life around (Braithwaite 2002, p. 103).
As we move up the pyramid through a first to a second to a third re-
storative conference, conference participants are likely to decide to esca-
late to increasingly punitive interventions. The policy idea is to persuade
participants that they should also keep escalating to new ideas and re-
sources for providing support for the offender. The philosophy of re-
storative justice is to empower stakeholders to take advice from experts
but then to make their own decisions contextually attuned to the cir-
cumstances of their offender. This includes knowledge of the programs
the community of care can persuade the offender to complete and theThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allneeds of his or her victim and other stakeholders in their conference.
A problem with this is that it does lead to a bricolage of community re-
sponses rather than one that maps mechanically from “what works”
criminology. This is a complex relational and community empowerment
process in which the problem rather than a stigmatized individual is at
the center of the circle. The content of the pyramid is not prescriptive.
The use of terms such as “escalated support,” between “wide” and “wider”
support, and “escalated deterrence”without specifying escalation “to what
specific measures” is intentional.
With complex phenomena, it is best not to follow the most evidence-
based strategy, but the best meta-strategy. The research question of
which strategy works best is trivial compared to the question of which
meta-strategy works best. Rarely will the first strategy attempted work in
a complex context that differs from the conditions of a controlled evalua-
tion trial. A good meta-strategy will inform stakeholders of results from
the “what works” literature and will presumptively try the most strongly
supported strategyfirst and then the secondmost strongly supported strat-
egy (after the first strategy fails). That presumption can be overridden in
light of particular circumstances. Clinicians, by analogy, try one therapy
after another for a patient, informed by their knowledge of the outcomes
of randomized controlled trials and also their knowledge of particular
cases, including what other medications patients are taking, their capabil-
ities for surviving the side effects of a therapy, how strong their hearts are,
and much more. As in restorative practice, clinicians can also decide what
to recommend in order to catalyze community controls that will prevent
spread of a contagion. In neither case does best practice involve a narrow
focus on an individuated view of what works.
More detailed discussions of how to go about the process of deciding
when and how to escalate up a responsive regulatory pyramid, and how to
mobilize networked escalation as opposed to simple state escalation, can
be found in Braithwaite, Makkai, and Braithwaite (2007) and Braithwaite
(2008, 2011). Intervention in complex phenomena like criminal careers
should follow a trajectory that first assumes answers are knowable and
known and therefore apply evidence-based strategies from normal sci-
ence (Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018, chap. 12). When that fails, assume
the challenge is knowable but unknown (and work to acquire at least
some contextual qualitative understanding of the knowable). Then if that
repeatedly fails, assume one is dealingwith a complex or chaotic phenom-
enon that is unknowable. In that situation of unknowability, do not surren-This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allder to analysis paralysis; keep probing with new forms of social support
that come out of restorative conversations until a resonant response begins
to produce positive change.
At the base of the responsive pyramid of sanctions are the most restor-
ative, dialogue-based approaches we can craft for securing compliance
with a just law. Of course, one reason for an approach that is deliberatively
responsive to complexity is that a particular law, or its interpretation, may
be of doubtful justice, in which case we can expect dialogue mainly to be
about the justice of the law. If excessive force was used during arrest or
if racism was in play, we can expect dialogue about whether it is the defen-
dant or the police who have committed the greater crime. This is a good
thing from a civic republican perspective, which provides a normative mo-
tivation for the theory (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990). As we move up the
sanctions pyramid, increasingly demanding interventions are involved.
The idea of the pyramid is that our presumption should always be to start
at the base. Then escalate to somewhat punitive approaches only reluc-
tantly and only when dialogue fails. Then escalate to even more punitive
approaches only when more modest sanctions fail.
Strategic use of the pyramid requires the regulator to resist categoriz-
ing problems into minor matters that should be dealt with at the base of
the pyramid, more serious ones that should be in the middle, and egre-
gious crimes at the pyramid’s peak. The presumptive preference, even for
serious crimes, is to try dialogue first, overriding that presumption only if
there are compelling reasons for doing so. There will be such reasons in
exceptional cases: a violent first offender who vows to keep pursuing the
victim to kill her may have to be locked up; a person who has never
offended but attempts to blow herself up in a subwaymay be killed by po-
lice who get a clear shot. The 2005 incident in which British police shot
an innocent Brazilian man in a subway who was suspected of terrorist in-
tent illustrates the justification for the responsive regulatory imperative
always to consider, however quickly, the viability of interventions at lower
levels of the pyramid.
As we move up the pyramid in response to a failure to elicit restorative
reform and repair, in most cases we eventually reach the point at which
reform and repair are forthcoming, even if it is many years later. When-
ever that point is reached, responsive regulation means that escalation is
reversed; the regulator de-escalates down. The pyramid is firm yet for-
giving in its demands for compliance. Reform must be rewarded just as
recalcitrant refusal to reform is ultimately punished.This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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AllA dramatic transformation of criminal law jurisprudence will be nec-
essary if evidence continues to mount supportive of responsive regula-
tory theory and we as a society are to reap the benefits of less crime
(Braithwaite and Pettit 1990). The imperative to de-escalate deterrence
responsively when an offender rehabilitates means that every year a re-
formed person remains in prison is needless suffering. It is a frittering
away of society’s scarce crime control resources.
If the empirical claims of responsive regulatory theory are right, this is
also a missed opportunity to reduce crime by putting rewards for re-
jecting a life of crime alongside sanctions for embracing crime. In prac-
tical terms, what is needed when social support succeeds in helping a pris-
oner serving a long sentence turn his or her back on a life of crime is a
return to the sentencing court for a hearing about the possibility of early
release. The sentencing judge in such hearings should be obliged to take
into account the views of victims who are willing to listen to the opinions
of parole professionals, the offender, and the offender’s family. From
a responsive regulatory perspective, a criminal law that keeps people in
prison until they have paid the proportionate penalty for their wrongdo-
ing is a profound folly. It is an indefensible policy in terms of a dynamic
theory of deterrence. It can make deterrence sense only under a passive
deterrence theory, especially a maximalist one, the passive theory that
minimally sufficient deterrence seeks to render obsolete.
The deterrent superiority of the active deterrence of the pyramid, as
opposed to the passive deterrence of a fixed scale of consistently imposed
penalties, is elaborated in Braithwaite (2002, pp. 73–136). Consistently
proportionate punishment is justified by proponents of a just deserts the-
ory of equal punishment for equal wrongs. Equal punishment for equal
wrongs, however, is a danger to justice. It privileges punitive equality for
offenders, while riding roughshod over the justice claims of future victims
of crimewho suffer because of an inferior crime prevention policy, of pres-
ent victims who may not want equal justice for equal wrongs to apply in
their case (e.g., who may prefer more compensation and less imprison-
ment), and of offenders’ family members who suffer to variable degrees
as a result of a breadwinner being in prison (Braithwaite 2002, 2003).
In any event, what kind of equality is expressed by a logic of equal
punishment for equal wrongs when some offenders are lucky enough
not to be raped or bashed in prison and others do suffer these horrors;
when some are trapped in prison-induced contagions of drug addiction
and others are not; when some acquire HIV, hepatitis, or tuberculosis inThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Minimally Sufficient Deterrence 79
Allprison systems that are the best-known incubators of these contagions,
and some do not? This is not to disagree that maximum sentences should
be set on the basis of seriousness but to say that the right sentence is the
minimally sufficient one.
Responsive regulation has had modest influence as a policy idea in the
domains of business regulation and corporate crime enforcement be-
cause it formulated a way to reconcile the clear empirical evidence that
sometimes sanctions work and sometimes they backfire—and likewise
with social support. The evidence of this is just as clear with common
crime; yet responsive regulation has had almost no influence on policing
policies. This would not have surprised Edwin Sutherland ([1949] 1983),
who 60 years ago first demonstrated propensities to tolerate forgiving
approaches toward crime in the suites that are seldom evident toward
crime in the streets.
Restorative justice provides stakeholders with professional advice on
rehabilitation and prevention options they might choose. The commu-
nity of care can then bemobilized tomonitor and enforce compliancewith
whatever is undertaken.This is an approach informed by values that define
not only a just legal order but also a caring civil society. These values are
derived from the foundational republican value of freedom as nondomi-
nation (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990; Pettit 1997). Some who share these
restorative values derive them from different foundations, including spir-
itual ones.
Ordering strategies in the pyramid is not just about putting less costly,
less coercive, more respectful options lower down in order to savemoney
and preserve freedom as nondomination. It is also that use of more dom-
inating, less respectful forms of social control only after more dialogic
forms have been tried first comes to be seen as more legitimate. When
regulation is seen as more legitimate and more procedurally fair, compli-
ance with law is more likely (Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002). Astute
business regulators often set up this legitimacy explicitly (Dekker and
Breakey 2016). During a restorative dialogue over an offense, the inspec-
tor will say there will be no penalty this time, but she hopes the manager
understands that if she returns to find the company has slipped out of
compliance again, she will have no choice but to refer it to the prose-
cutions unit. If and when the manager explicitly agrees that this is a rea-
sonable approach, a future prosecution will likely be viewed as fair. Un-
der this theory, therefore, privileging restorative justice at the base of the
pyramid builds legitimacy and therefore prevents crime.This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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AllThere is also a rational choice account of why the pyramid works. Sys-
tem capacity crises result in pretenses of consistent law enforcement when
the reality is that punishment is spread thinly, weakly (Pontell 1978;
Pontell, Black, andGeis 2014). Unfortunately, this problemwill be worst
when lawbreaking is worst; criminal justice is a sprinkler system that fails
when the fire gets hot. Hardened offenders learn that the odds of serious
punishment are low for any particular infraction. Tools like tax audits
that are supposed to be about deterrence can backfire by teaching tax
cheats how much they can get away with (Kinsey 1986).1 The reluctance
to escalate under the responsive pyramid model means that enforcement
can be selective in a principled way. The display of the pyramid itself
channels the rational actor down to the base of the pyramid. Noncompli-
ance comes to be seen (accurately) as a slippery slope. In effect, the pyr-
amid solves the system capacity problem by making punishment cheap.
The pyramid says “unless you punish yourself for lawbreaking through
an agreed action plan near the base of the pyramid, we will punish you
more severely higher up the pyramid (and we stand ready to go as high
as we have to).” So, it is cheaper for the rational actor to self-punish (as
by agreeing to payouts to victims or community service). Some Asian
criminal justice systems, such as that of Japan, work this way much of
the time, even for serious crimes such as rape, aggravated assault, and
murder that are frequently resolved through compensation and remorse-
ful apology rather than through prison time, without such reparative le-
niency causing crime to spin out of control (Ahmed et al. 2001). Once the
pyramid succeeds in creating a world in which most punishment is self-
punishment, there is no longer a crisis of capacity to deliver punishment
when it is needed. One of the messages the pyramid provides to corpo-
rate criminals is that “if you violate repeatedly without reform, it is going
to be cheap for us to hurt you (because you are going to help us hurt
you)” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 44).
Paternoster and Simpson (1996) showed the limits of passive specific
deterrence on intentions to commit corporate crime.When respondents
held personalmoral codes, these weremore important for predicting com-
pliance than were rational calculations of sanction threats (though the lat-1 On balance, however, Mazzolini, Pagani, and Santoro (2017) found that audits in-
creased reported income by 8 percent on average, though audits that detected no extra
tax liability reduced future reported income in the short term. See also Mendoza, Wiel-
houwer, and Kirchler (2017).
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Allter were important too). Appeals to business ethics (e.g., through restor-
ative justice that exposes executives to consequences for victims of a corpo-
rate crime) therefore may be a better first strategy than sanction threats
(Parker 2004). Best to succeed or fail with such ethical appeals first and
then escalate to deterrence for the minority of contexts in which deter-
rence works better than ethical appeals. One of the psychological prin-
ciples in play here is that when intrinsic motivation to comply with the
law is intact, we do not want to crowd out intrinsic motivation with extrinsic
threats (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, pp. 49–50; Osterloh and Frey 2013;
Frey 2017). Nine meta-analyses after responsive theory and behavioral
economics picked up “crowding out” and “minimal sufficiency” from de-
velopmental psychology, there remains strong psychological evidence that
crowding out does occur but also that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
both independently affect behavior (Cerasoli, Nicklin, and Ford 2014).
According to responsive regulatory theory, what we want is a legal
system in which citizens learn that responsiveness is the way our legal
institutions work. Once they see law as a responsive regulatory system,
they know that there will be a chance to argue about unjust laws or un-
just enforcement (as opposed to being forced into a lower court produc-
tion line or a plea bargain). But they will also see that game playing to
avoid legal obligations inexorably produces escalation. So does failure
to listen to arguments about the harms their actions are doing and what
redress is required. The forces of law are listening, fair, and therefore
legitimate, but also ultimately are viewed as invincible.
A paradox of the pyramid is that to the extent that we can guarantee
a commitment to escalate if steps are not taken to prevent the recur-
rence of lawbreaking, then escalation beyond the lower levels of the
pyramid need rarely occur. This is the image of invincibility making
self-regulation probable. Without locked-in commitment to escalation
when reform fails to fix the problem, the system capacity crisis rebounds.
A fundamental resource of responsive regulation is the belief of citizens
in the inexorability of escalation if problems are not fixed.
Restorative justice works best with a specter of punishment threaten-
ing in the background but never threatened in the foreground. When
punishment is thrust into the foreground even by implied threats, other-
regarding deliberation is made difficult because the offender is pushed
to deliberate in a self-regarding way—out of concern to protect him- or
herself from punishment. This is not the way to engender empathy with
the victim, internalization of the values of the law, and the values of restor-This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allative justice. The job of responsive regulators is to treat offenders as wor-
thy of trust. When regulators do this, the law more often achieves its ob-
jectives (Braithwaite and Makkai 1994; Gangl, Hofmann, and Kirchler
2015; Haas et al. 2015). The ideal is to enculturate trust (in the fore-
ground) while institutionalizing distrust (in the background) through
deterrence as a last resort (Braithwaite 1998).
Testing theories about dynamic interventions layered in a pyramid is
more complex than testing the effects of passive policies like heavier sen-
tences because the effects of sequences of interventions must be tested.
How can a regulatory pyramid be tested when it involves an entire suite of
sequenced dialogic, then deterrent, and then incapacitative approaches?
It has worked in raising an extra billion dollars in tax for eachmillion spent
on a program for multinational companies engaged in illegal profit shift-
ing (to tax havens, e.g.; Braithwaite 2005, pp. 89–100). Evaluation in a tax
compliance context requires first the creation of this whole pyramid of
sequenced new policies for companies that have been paying no tax,
and then observation of how much tax they pay after the new pyramid
is put in place, as well as observing at what sequenced stage of the pyramid
most tax payment starts to flow. The quality of information from the lat-
ter observations is instructive, yet low, because we do not know whether
a compliance effect is the result of the last step up the pyramid or a com-
bined effect of some subset of the whole sequence of escalations. A com-
parable evaluation challenge applies to problem-oriented policing as a
meta-strategy. Randomizing some police patrols to problem-oriented
policing shows that problem-oriented policing works as a meta-strategy
(Braga 2002; Weisburd et al. 2010), but it gives feedback of limited qual-
ity on which initiatives addressing what problems produced the result.
Even so, evaluating meta-strategies is more important work for criminol-
ogy than evaluating single crime control strategies. How to think clearly
about evidence in relation to dynamic theories of support and sanctions is
the topic of a complementary paper (Braithwaite 2016).II. Inexorability of Support and Sanctions
Inexorability has three elements:
• prioritizing increased consistency of detection above tougher pun-
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All• always taking serious crimes seriously with a continuum of restor-
ative responses to every detected serious crime; avoiding “do noth-
ing” responses;
• escalating the seriousness of response to a second, third, and fourth
offense; sticking with the problem until it goes away.A. Prioritize Detection
The inexorability piece of the theory builds on the evidence from the
deterrence literature that perceived and actual severity of punishment
are rarely good predictors of compliance with the law, while perceived
and actual certainty of detection are often useful predictors (Blumstein
2011; Robinson 2011; Friesen 2012; Nagin 2013). One reason for this
is that detection mobilizes not only formal punishment but also informal
disapproval, which is a more powerful driver of compliance with the law
(Braithwaite 1989). Theoretically, this is not just about an evolution of
cooperation (Axelrod 1984), an evolution of compliance when noncom-
pliance is visible to a punisher. The newer theoretical insight is that it is
also about indirect reciprocity through fear of reputational loss even
without repeated encounters with the same people (Berger 2011; Nowak
2012; Braithwaite and Hong 2015). Criminologists therefore tend to
read the deterrence literature as showing that “detection deterrence”
and “disapproval deterrence,” both specific and general, are more pow-
erful than deterrence by severe formal sentences. Minimally sufficient
deterrence is based on this view that “detection deterrence,” indirect rec-
iprocity, and “disapproval deterrence” are indeedmore powerful than de-
terrence by severe state punishment.
B. Always Respond
Inexorability is absent in contemporary urban justice. Enforcement
swamping and system capacity overload mean that young people picked
up as minor first offenders learn that they do not receive significant pun-
ishments even if they are prosecuted. This is also likely to happen with
their second, third, or fourth minor offenses during their teenage years.
When the system does finally decide to hit youth offenders hard because
someone decides they have “had enough chances,” offenders wonder
“why now?” Legitimacy is obviously a casualty of this policing strategy
for muddling through system capacity crises. Tough punishment seemsThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allto repeat offenders to have unfairly come out of the blue, when they got
away with worse in the past, when they see friends get away with even
worse. Because this seems arbitrary, it has shallow legitimacy in their eyes.
In the next section, I consider an alternative response approach to first,
second, third, fourth, and fifth offenses.C. Escalate Responses
The trouble with inexorability is that it is hard to reconcile with min-
imal sufficiency of punishment. Punishing everyone detected seems like
maximal net widening rather than minimally sufficient. The challenge of
averting net widening is to craft a minimally sufficient response for a mi-
nor first offense. Police, teachers, or parents who observe children hit-
ting each other do well to pause to insist that they stop fighting and say
something nonstigmatizing like “You guys are better than that,” and then
walk on. This is a better way of taking violence seriously than looking the
otherway. It ismore than “nattering” as onewalks bywithout stopping the
violence (Patterson and Bank 1989) but less than net widening, which
creates some kind of recording of alleged wrongdoing.
Restorative theory can inform an inexorability that averts a perception
of an arbitrary punishment lottery. The evidence is strong that restor-
ative justice buttresses the legitimacy of the justice system (Tyler et al.
2007; Sherman 2014; Barnes et al. 2015; Miller and Hefner 2015). Pros-
ecution is not the way to go with a first-offending child arrested for a
petty offense. Nor is turning a blind eye. A restorative police caution with
a degree of ritual seriousness is an option. Police can respond to a shop-
keeper holding a child who has stolen something by ensuring the child
returns stolen property and taking the shopkeeper’s contact details, and
then either taking the child home to ask parents or guardians what they
intend to do or holding the child at the police station until parents arrive
to take him home following a restorative caution. The restorative caution
gives the child and parent space to come up with the suggestion that they
will visit the shopkeeper together to apologize, perhaps even bake a cake
or bring some flowers. Traditionalists see such idiosyncratic gestures of
apology as strange elements to take seriously in criminal justice policy;
yet that is the essence of trusting the community rather than the police
with averting an offender’s reaction that “nothing happened, so breaking
the law is no big deal.” Police tell the parents that they expect a text ad-
vising what has been done to apologize. The police say they may checkThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allthat the shopkeeper is satisfied. In other words, most of the work of so-
cial disapproval is delegated away from the police. One reason for this as
one approach to taking every crime seriously is the evidence that censure
by families and closest friends is more likely to be a reintegrative form
of shaming, while censure by criminal justice officials is more likely to
be stigmatizing (Ahmed et al. 2001, pp. 157–76).
So, what to do with the teenager’s second minor offense? The mini-
mally sufficient deterrence suggestion is a restorative justice conference
that the victim is invited to attend. The child’s loved ones would be ex-
pected to sit in the circle for a serious family ritual of parents, grandparents,
siblings, perhaps aunts, uncles, and a sports coach or a teacher trusted and
nominated by the child. Communicating this expectation is important
because a concern is to ensure that overburdened mothers do not shoul-
der all the burdens of social support. Wider circles of participation also
enhance the effectiveness of restorative justice (Braithwaite 2002, pp. 50–
51, 55, 74, 252–65).2 Unlike a criminal trial that assembles people who
can inflict maximum damage to those on the other side of the case, the
restorative justice conference assembles people who can offer maximum
support to their own side, be it the victim’s or the offender’s. At a meet-
ing of two communities of care, communication of disapproval comes
from those personally affected by the crime, but more importantly from
those who most love the offender. Nathan Harris’s evidence from re-
storative justice conferences is that only disapproval communicated by
people the offender most loves is effective in inducing remorse (Harris
2001, pp. 157–76). People who are well liked but not loved are not po-
tent at inducing remorse. Nor are the police.
While an informal police caution for a first offense is a minimalist re-
sponse in terms of taking the crime seriously, a restorative justice con-
ference for a second offense escalates to a longer family and community
ritual with a trained facilitator and a wider circle of participation by peo-
ple concerned about the child. Such a conference becomes a focused way
of supporting children. Are they struggling in school? If so, what support
can the conference mobilize? Are they struggling in their relationships?
Are their friends leading them into trouble? Is there support from other
friends who steer them clear of such trouble? If there are problems with2 This result is also evident in Wilson, Olaghere, and Kimbrell’s (2017) meta-analysis
finding that teen courts, impact panels, and reparative boards were ineffective forms of
what some loosely call “restorative justice.”
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Allalcohol, drugs, or anger management, proactive support may be needed.
In this world of social support, every child leans on a “youth support circle.”
This is a restoratively elaborated version of parent-teacher conferences
in schools that meet every year with every child over 12, with their ex-
tended family, and with well-networked elders until the child is helped
to get his or her first job or get into college (Braithwaite 2001). The
youth support circle is designed to reduce stigmatization of crime by be-
ing universal; children who never do anything wrong have them. In that
world of a better-funded, more communal, welfare state, this conference
for a second offense has no extra cost because it would be integrated into
routine youth support conferences for building human capital, affecting
only the timing of a conference that might normally be annual.
What about a third criminal offense? A longer restorative conference
with a wider circle of participants is needed, usually with a follow-up con-
ference to celebrate completion of an agreement. That would be more
onerous than the conference for the second offense. More importantly,
the next conference would see an escalation of social support for the child
compared to the first conference. A child welfare worker would attend.
The expertise a trained social worker would bring would include knowl-
edge of the range of options available in the area for rehabilitation of the
young offender. The social worker should also have a knowledge of
principles of risk-need-responsivity in evidence-based selection of reha-
bilitation options (Andrews and Bonta 1998, 2010), a sound knowledge of
the “what works” literature of criminology, and a good clinical capacity
for responsiveness to the complexities of the specific case. In a restor-
ative justice conference, it is not the job of the expert to dictate to a fam-
ily (Pennell and Burford 2000). Restorative justice works by delivering
stronger implementation of conference agreements enforced by the par-
ties themselves than courts can achieve with police enforcement. This was
the biggest effect size in theCanadianDepartment of Justicemeta-analysis
of restorative justice by Latimer, Dowden, and Muise (2001). The effects
of completion of restorative justice agreements were much stronger than
the statistically significant effect of restorative justice on reduced reoffend-
ing compared to control group members.
We can reconcile these results by understanding that if a restorative
justice conference and a court both send a child to a counterproductive
program, restorative justice will do more damage. The child will be more
likely to complete the counterproductive program when it was agreed
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Alloutcome is ordered by the court. Restorative justice does greater harm
than court when it agrees on counterproductive measures and greater
good than court when it agrees on effective measures. The reason is that
restorative justice is a superior delivery vehicle for rehabilitation pro-
grams.
The idea is to strengthen this comparative advantage of restorative
conferences by investing in experts who speak up when the family
considers sending the child to a boot camp, experts who point out that
the evidence for the effectiveness of boot camps is discouraging (Lipsey
2009; MacKenzie and Farrington 2015). It follows from this that a good
way to reanalyze a meta-analysis such as that by Lipsey (2009) would be
to assess whether the combination of highly effective interventions such
as social cognitive programs with restorative justice as their delivery ve-
hicle increases effect sizes. Put more provocatively, it is not useful to
compare effect sizes for restorative justice with those for other programs
because it is better to conceive of restorative justice as a way of delivering
multiple strategies. It makes more sense to compare restorative justice
with a court as an alternative delivery vehicle of diverse correctional op-
tions, as in Strang et al. (2013). The bigger insights might come from teas-
ing out which specific combinations of programs and delivery vehicles
have positive and negative synergies, as is done in the business regulation
literature (Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair 1998).
A conference for a fourth offense might allow the family to mobilize
rehabilitative options from further afield or expensive options that are
rationed. Critics might query why such an expansion of the quantum
of social support would make a difference given that in Lipsey’s (2009,
p. 141) meta-analysis of youth justice programs, providing more hours
of services surprisingly did not increase the effect sizes of interventions.
Restorative justice programs were the big exception to this result; hours
of restorative service provision strongly increased the already statisti-
cally significant effect size of restorative justice in reducing reoffend-
ing. Within the “restorative justice” category of programs, those that in-
cluded a mediation component, as opposed to simple restitution, also had
an effect size more than one-third higher (Lipsey 2009, p. 142).
A conference for a fourth offense might also send the conference op-
tion to court for approval (or modification) by a judge. A meta-analysis
from seven British studies led by Joanna Shapland concluded that restor-
ative justice conferences have benefits that average eight times their
costs (Strang et al. 2013, pp. 44–46). This result is a reason we do notThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allconsider costly escalation to court until a fourth offense. Yet isn’t esca-
lation to something less cost-effective at any stage surely inept? Actually,
there is a relevant complexity of the evidence that should leave us open
to this. While the Strang et al. review found that court is clearly less ef-
fective in preventing crime than restorative justice, it also suggested that
a combination of court and conference could be more effective than ei-
ther separately.More data are needed to assess if this is robust. The quan-
titative transitional justice literature finds that war crime prosecutions,
truth (and reconciliation) commissions, and amnesties all have limited
or contextual explanatory power on their own. However, when all three
are used together, that country can experience a strong reduction in hu-
man rights abuses, at least if the truth commission engagement with civil
society is wide and deep and if amnesties are qualified rather than blanket
(Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010; Dancy et al. 2013; see also Sikkink 2011,
pp. 184–87). The combined cost of a restorative justice conference that
then reports to court might also be less than the sum of its parts if the in-
tegration can be designed to streamline court processing. This is essen-
tially how the most comprehensive youth justice conferencing program
in the world operates in New Zealand ( Johnstone 2013).
At a fourth conference, when a young person and a victim are on the
precipice of deeper trouble, escalated interventionist expectations can be
assumed by the community of care. For example, in a 2014 interview I
was told of a teenager in an Irish Republican Army area of Belfast who
had repeatedly assaulted his mother. The restorative conference was
conducted by Community Restorative Justice Northern Ireland. One
part of the community restorative justice agreement, which had many
parts, was that four community members agreed to respond immediately
to calls for help from themother and participated in training on how they
could respond. These were not civil servants living far away, arriving the
next morning. They lived around the corner and committed to respond
promptly 24 hours a day. This is a good example of how restorative jus-
tice can expand to a wider, more immediate, more proximate web of so-
cial control and social support, while still providing a softer web than
court enforcement to protect the mother by locking up her child.
By this point in our inexorability narrative, deterrence maximalists
will be aghast that we are at a fifth criminal offense with no formally pu-
nitive response presumed. The offender has had “five free hits”: the po-
lice restorative caution, followed by three restorative justice conferences,
and then a first court appearance, all “doing nothing” for punitive deter-This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allrence. Perhaps there will have been six if the first restorative caution was
preceded by an informal warning on the run.
Contrary tomaximalist fears, offenders do not perceive restorative jus-
tice conferences as “doing nothing,” but as a grueling experience ofmeet-
ing their victims in the presence of their loved ones (Umbreit and Coates
1992; Schiff 1999). Deterrence maximalists are wrong to see imprison-
ment as the only kind of perceptually tough response. Perceptually, the
process is the punishment, as the title of Malcolm Feeley’s (1979) book
attests, especially when the process is designed with a ritual seriousness
that is emotionally demanding.III. Dynamic Deterrence and Defiance
The Sword of Damocles is an ancient metaphor popularized by the Ro-
man republican philosopher Cicero (1877, pp. 185–86). He based it on
the story of Dionysius II, a Sicilian king of the fourth and fifth centuries
BCE, who hung a sword attached by a horsehair above the head of a
courtier called Damocles who envied the king. The ruler wanted to il-
lustrate the insecurity of being king. Today, the Sword of Damocles
generally refers to any ever-present peril hanging over the head of a per-
son. The existence of an ever-present peril is an important element of
minimally sufficient deterrence.
A. Preserving the Sword
At the court appearance for a fifth offense in a criminal career, the
court might signal that a sword hangs over the child or young adult. This
is not best done as a threat. The power of the sword, according toCicero, is
not that it falls or is threatened; its power is that it hangs. The regulatory
literature shows that the better signaling is for the judge to say at the outset
of the court hearing for a fifth offense that its objective is to support the
family and save them from having their child taken away. Perhaps only
later than a fifth offense and only after an offense that is very serious would
the judge ask whether the offender would think it reasonable that she be
incarcerated to protect the community if she were to commit another of-
fense of such seriousness.3 The objective at that later trial is to open the3 Note the use of motivational interviewing techniques here, which are empirically es-
tablished as techniques that are effective and that avert threat making (Rubak et al. 2005;
Lundahl et al. 2010).
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Allmind of the offender to the reasonableness of the community protecting
itself with a custodial sentence. The idea at the next trial for the next seri-
ous offense would be to remind the offender that she herself in her last ap-
pearance said that a custodial sentence would be reasonable if an offense of
this seriousness recurred. The judge would then concede the offender’s
point of view but mobilize social support for one last chance to stay in
the community, while making it clear that next time she was likely to agree
with the incapacitation recourse that the offender herself had concluded
was reasonable in these circumstances.
At every stage, the minimally sufficient approach requires that the of-
fender be led to see a new escalation of social support provided in re-
sponse to a new transgression, but also a slippery slope toward a set of pu-
nitive options with life imprisonment at the peak of the pyramid.Of course,
community service orders, fines, electronically monitored home deten-
tion, orders to a violent husband to transfer bank accounts to his wife so
she has the financial capacity to leave him, and a diverse variety of other
options that are found lower in the pyramid are available as alternatives
to prison. The sheer diversity of community gifts of support conveys a
message of care when it includes, for example, the Royal Society for the
Protection of Cruelty to Animals program in Australia, which guarantees
care to the pets of domestic violence victims who stay in abusive relation-
ships to care for their pets or to the pets of offenders who are required to
move out. The escalation of support as a life careens into deeper trouble is
a way of increasing the legitimacy of more severe sanctions as a last resort
when escalation to them does occur. It is also a strategy for combating the
widespread perception of criminal offenders inmany societies that the sys-
tem lets you get away with it for years and then one day out of the blue
locks you up. The proposal is inexorable both in escalating support and
in the way it signals a move to escalating deterrence.
Why reserve court appearances until a fourth official detected of-
fense? Why reserve serious sanctions for later still in a criminal career?
One reason is the evidence from the Canberra randomized controlled
trials of restorative justice led by Lawrence Sherman andHeather Strang.
Offenders randomly assigned to restorative justice had greater fear of fu-
ture criminal enforcement after a restorative justice experience than did
offenders randomly assigned to criminal prosecution after their criminal
trials (Braithwaite 2002, pp. 119–22). Offenders emerged from their re-
storative conferences more fearful that they would be rearrested if they
offended again, more fearful of family and friends finding out, and moreThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allfearful of a future conference, compared to those assigned to court (Sher-
man and Strang 1997; Sherman et al. 1998). Minimally sufficient deter-
rence favors restorative justice for multiple early offenses in a criminal
career because restorative justice sharpens the Sword of Damocles. Crim-
inal trials blunt the sword hanging over the offender. After bringing down
the courtroom sword, it loses mystique. The criminal trial in current judi-
cial practice blunts the Sword ofDamocles because in themajority of non-
serious cases the offender is surprised at how easily she gets off as the court
struggles with its system capacity overload.
The minimally sufficient deterrence idea is to hold the trial in reserve
until it is time to take the case very seriously by projecting a clear trajec-
tory of escalation to an ever bigger Sword of Damocles that is being
averted by more and more support. Among other objectives, this sup-
port is intended to make that sharpening sword appear ever more just.
Other kinds of criminological evidence support a Sword of Damocles ef-
fect (Sherman 1992, 2011), including Dunford’s (1990) finding that a war-
rant for arrest deterred domestic violence substantially better than either
actual arrest or nonarrest. The theoretical perspective of minimal suffi-
ciency is that warrants for arrest have great attractions over actual arrest
and that deferred prosecutions are more powerful tools than actual pros-
ecutions. These are problem-solving tools that can enable support to play
a larger role than sanctions. Concluding that deferred prosecutions are in
principle powerful tools is not to deny that their widespread use in cor-
porate criminal law has often approximated doing nothing in matters of a
seriousness that called for doing quite a lot (Eisinger 2017).B. Dynamic Deterrence That Accounts for Defiance
Responsive regulatory theory argues that the passive deterrence think-
ing of the law and economics tradition, as in Gary Becker’s (1993) Nobel
Prize–winning work, has limited value. The reason is that real-world de-
terrence unfolds dynamically. Dynamic deterrence moves through se-
quences of threats; passive deterrence is static, involving levels of threat
that are constant across time. International relations theorists have been
more dynamically sophisticated than criminologists and economists of
deterrence. They do not assume that, even though the United States has
a bigger deterrent arsenal than the rest of the world’s militaries, it works
for the United States to say to another country “Do what we say or else!”
There is evidence aplenty, from countries as close as Cuba, that threats areThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allas likely to induce defiance as compliance. This is accepted even by con-
servative writers like Michael Rubin who oppose dialogue with “rogue
states.” Rubin (2014, p. 4) nevertheless conceived of Cuba, North Ko-
rea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya as “backlash states” that were “defiant.” Former
US Defense Secretary William Cohen tweaked this definition of rogue
states to conceive of them as regimes “immune to traditional deterrence”
(Rubin 2014, p. 4). While demands for compliance backed by passive de-
terrence work poorly in international affairs, when the United States
dynamically escalates its deterrent power around a weaker country, as
it did during the Cuban missile crisis, it can get a deterrent result (dis-
mantled Cuban missiles). Of course, dynamic escalation of deterrence
in international affairs is a dangerous game because little Cuba might
mobilize powerful friends to dynamic escalation of their deterrent capa-
bilities in response. Little Serbia did manage to dynamically escalate cat-
astrophic deterrence by triggering the escalation to World War I after
the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by its citizens.
Psychologists of learning approach the way punishments work as dy-
namic learning sequences that are beyond the writ of static deterrence
models. They demonstrated psychological reactance to threats (Brehm
and Brehm 1981). Defiance is a more elegant term that Sherman (1992)
deployed to describe this phenomenon.
A paradox of the pyramid is that by being able to escalate to tough re-
sponses at its peak, more of the regulatory action can be driven down to
its deliberative base. Yet punishment, according to responsive regulatory
theory, simultaneously increases deterrence and defiance. Figure 2 is a
way of summarizing the implications of more than 50 experiments on de-
fiance originally conducted by Brehm and Brehm (1981) and their col-
leagues, and many more since (e.g., Rains 2013). At low levels of punish-
ment, defiance usually exceeds deterrence. Figure 2 expresses this as the
resistance effect exceeding the capitulation effect at lower levels of coer-
cion. The dashed line is the net compliance effect represented as a sum of
the resistance score and the capitulation score. Only when punishment
bites very deeply at the peak of the pyramid, resulting in many giving
up on resistance, does the deterrence effect exceed the defiance effect.
Yet escalation only as far as the lower levels of the pyramid can elicit
compliance when that first step up the ladder is seen as a signal of willing-
ness to redeem the regulator’s promise to keep climbing until the problem
is fixed. Put another way, the first escalation becomes a wake-up call that
convinces the offender that she or he is on a slippery slope. Social supportThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allinitiatives also help by signaling that paths off that slope are available. Per-
ception of the dynamic inexorability of the pyramid does most deterrence
work, not the passive general deterrent. Not only does the specific passive
deterrent at low levels of the pyramid of sanctions fail to deter very effec-
tively; it mostly engenders more defiance than deterrence.
Redundancy in the design of the pyramid also saves the day when de-
fiance effects initially exceed deterrence effects. The redundancy idea is
that all regulatory tools have deep dangers of counterproductivity. There-
fore, one must deploy a mix of regulatory tools with heavy representation
of dialogue and social support in the mix. The best way to deploy the
mix is dynamically, so that, in sequence, the strengths of one tool have
a chance to cover the weaknesses of another. For example, the pyramid
in figure 1 is about the strengths of one form of restorative justice cov-
ering the weaknesses of other forms of restorative justice, the strengths of
deterrence covering the weaknesses of restorative justice, the strengths of
incapacitation covering the weaknesses of deterrence, and the strengths
of strong social support covering the weaknesses of limp social support.
The risk of defiance exceeding deterrence is one reason that the peak
of the pyramid should always be threatening in the background but not
directly threatened in the foreground. Making threats increases defi-FIG. 2.—A theory of the effect of coercion on compliance as the net result of a capitulation ef-
fect and a defiant resistance effect. Source: Based loosely on experiments summarized by Brehm
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Allance, turning the defiance curve in figure 2 more steeply downward.
How then can police and judges be threatening in the background with-
out making threats? One way is by being transparent for the first time
that the pyramid is the new policy that precedes escalation. Law enforcers
must be the change they want to see. They achieve this by communicat-
ing openly with society about the design policy of the pyramid. By invit-
ing citizens to be partners in the democratic design of different regula-
tory pyramids for responding to different crime problems, citizens also
come to learn about the inexorability of escalation until there is compli-
ance with the law. The ideal is to communicate the inexorability of deter-
rence in this way rather than by making threats in specific cases.C. Dynamic Deterrence as a Remedy to Enforcement Swamping
A dependable, inexorable peak to the pyramid is a particular way of
thinking about what Mark Kleiman (2009) calls dynamic concentration
of deterrence, often called (in a misleadingly static way) focused deter-
rence.4 For responsive regulation, the dynamic concentration of deter-
rence potency is at the rarely used peak of the pyramid. Kleiman, like
David Kennedy (2009), reached a conclusion similar to responsive reg-
ulatory theory about the superiority of dynamic over passive deterrence
through contemplating how to respond to enforcement swamping as a
challenge for thinly resourced policing agencies.
Kleiman’s dynamic concentration theory shows why abandoning ran-
dom targeting in favor of a strategic concentration of targeting can work
as long as monitoring works. In the simple case of scarce resources en-
abling targeting of only one of two regulated actors, the intuition that
“concentrating on Al would allow Bob to run wild” is wrong. If Al is4 The danger of describing the theory behind innovations like Operation Ceasefire as
“focused deterrence” is that it will be understood as a static policy of identifying the highest
risk group for targeting. Even the principal authors of the strategy, who clearly understand
its dynamic qualities, often describe a static deterrence targeting strategy, complemented by
short breakouts into discussing its dynamic aspects (Kennedy, Kleiman, and Braga 2017).
The most common mistake business regulators make concerning responsive regulation is
to understand it as a static policy of triaging the highest risk groups for targeting with more
deterrent strategies. The point of reframing deterrence is to push criminologists away from
such static ways of thinking. Minimally sufficient deterrence commends restorative justice
as an alternative to prison even in the highest-risk circumstances such as creeping genocide,
actual genocide, or murders that risk further revenge killings (e.g., Braithwaite and Gohar
2014).
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Allpromised certain punishment, a rational Al will comply as long as com-
pliance costs are less than penalties. “Then Bob, seeing that Al has com-
plied, will himself comply; otherwise Bob knows that he would certainly
be punished. So giving priority to Al actually increases pressure on Bob.”
In this we see the dynamic elements of the strategy. Kleiman (2009,
p. 54) shows that this initial insight holds for a variety of conditions such
as promising certain punishment of the second mover rather than the
first and larger numbers of players. Dynamic concentration helps a little
punishment go a long way.
Tax authorities have also learned how to respond to massive enforce-
ment swamping when rich people, trusts, and companies follow their
herds into illegal tax shelters. This is to announce that while the tax au-
thority lacks the resources to enforce the law against all who stampede
into shelters, they can prosecute the first risk taker to jump into a shelter
after the date of their announcement of intent to attack particular shelters
in the courts. This can be extremely effective in ending cascades of risky
tax cheating by high-wealth individuals and corporations (Braithwaite
2005). Braithwaite (2012) discovered the same dynamic concentration
in the wisdom of generals who face the biggest enforcement swamping
challenge in the world today: small numbers of UN peacekeepers facing
Africa’s worst war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
As usual, practitioners here were ahead of theory. Tax officials were
ahead of us, as were those generals in Congo and that Texas ranger on
the screen in our youth. The ranger faces a lynch mob with one bullet
in his gun.He turns them away with the promise “the first to step forward
dies.” Kleiman (2009, pp. 49–67) elegantly theorizes why the dynamic
concentration of deterrence by the Texas ranger works. A meta-analysis
of 10 quasi-experimental and one randomized controlled trial of dy-
namic concentration found consistent effectiveness across studies and a
medium-sized statistically significant crime reduction effect overall (Braga
and Weisburd 2012, 2014; Weisburd, Farrington, and Gill 2017). The
intuition that concentrating deterrence on Max will allow Mary to run
wild turns out to be wrong in terms of rational choice theory (Kleiman
2009, pp. 49–67) and empirically wrong according to Braga, Apel, and
Welsh (2013, p. 315), who found that with dynamically concentrated de-
terrence, “vicariously treated gangs were deterred by the treatment ex-
periences of their rivals and allies.” Dynamic focusing at the peak of a
pyramid is just one way of concentrating limited enforcement resources
that delivers dynamism to both specific and general deterrence.This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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AllD. Dynamically Raising the Bar Serious Offenders Must Jump
Boston’s Operation Ceasefire is criminology’s locus classicus of the dy-
namic concentration of deterrence in showing how an inner-city justice
system overwhelmed by the frequency of gang violence reduced homi-
cide (Kennedy 2009). It was also “focused deterrence” in that it did not
attempt to deter all crimes perpetrated by gang members, but only their
gun crimes. My hypothesis is that the passively focused features of Op-
eration Ceasefire may have some value, but its dynamic concentration of
deterrence is more innovative and more germinal. It follows that a re-
running and updating of the encouraging Braga and Weisburd (2012)
meta-analysis are needed to compare those interventions that were sim-
ply focused and passive in their deterrence with those in which the inter-
vention also delivered a dynamic concentration of deterrence. The dy-
namic concentration aspect of Operation Ceasefire involved the Texas
ranger trope described above. Police sat down inmeetings with gang leaders
and gangs to let them know, in effect, that we know that you know that we
do not have the capacity to go after all of you for all your sins. But we do
have the capacity to go after all the offenses, and all the parole and proba-
tion breaches, of all the members of the next gang to use a firearm in a
crime. This means that instead of concentrating deterrence on the worst
offenders, deterrence was dynamically concentrated on the first offender
to use a firearm after the announcement date. The theory of the interven-
tion was that all gangs would self-regulate gun carrying and use to avoid
being the first gang to be targeted or the second gang to be targeted after
the first. The ethnographic side of the evidence on the formidable desis-
tance of these gangs from gun use seems to support this hope (Kennedy
2009). For proportionality theorists, it is of course a weakness of the pro-
gram that it diverts resources fromprosecuting themost serious offenses to
what might be minor parole violations after a gang uses guns.5
Operation Ceasefire was in tension with the minimally sufficient de-
terrence model in two ways, however. First, the approach was thin on
restorative justice and social support as approaches that strengthen a de-
terrence strategy into which restorative justice and social support are in-
tegrated. There was certainly dialogue with gang members involved, and
pathways out of the gang were discussed and even provided for some;5 This critique also applies to responsive regulation. It has been eloquently advanced by
Karen Yeung (2004).
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Allbut from the perspective of minimally sufficient deterrence, it was too
narrowly oriented to pulling levers to make deterrence more “swift and
certain” for a strategically targeted subgroup.There are reasons to suspect
that in some of these programs this swift and certain deterrence may have
been communicated with Trumpian threats, which risk being counter-
productive according to minimal sufficiency theory, defiance theory, and
the theory of motivational interviewing.
There was insufficient attention in Operation Ceasefire to a dynamic
approach to support. Under the minimally sufficient deterrence model,
support peaks during the period in which desistance is setting in. I am
inclined to read protests from the leaders of the innovation that this is
not true as overstated and revisionist (Kennedy, Kleiman, and Braga
2017). That matters little. If moderately violent societies like the United
States are to learn how to manage their hot spots better from experience
with peacekeeping in extremely violent societies like Congo, we might
be able to build a consensus for dynamic concentration of support to be-
come more prominent than dynamic concentration of deterrence. This
policy lesson has been better learned in international peacekeeping and
peace building than in national policing to control organized violence
(Braithwaite and D’Costa 2018, chap. 3). The lesson is that desistance
shouldnot only cause a lifting of punishment; the strategy should alsomax-
imally concentrate rewards at the moment of desistance. The rewards are
not only tangible matters of vocational training and job placement, but
also rituals of pride at celebration conferences inwhich loved ones eulogize
peacemaking and rehearse redemption scripts (Maruna 2001).
Project HOPE is a drug court program in the focused deterrence tra-
dition that initially seemed to have promising pyramidal features of es-
calated response targeted on hard cases. HOPE stood for Hawai’i Op-
portunity Probation with Enforcement. It has been adopted in dozens
of US locations with Honest replacing Hawai’i, yet with mostly very
limited investment in creating job or other “opportunities.” Intervention
escalated as drug users went off the rails. Yet it may be the program that
ran off the rails; much of the rhetoric of its practitioners was maximalist,
oriented to “swift and certain” deterrence. This happened when the ev-
idence is not supportive of criminal justice swiftness, even though swift-
ness of parental response in child-rearing is important (Pratt and Turano-
vic 2018).
Hawken and Kleiman (2009) entitle their evaluation Managing Drug
Involved Probationers with Swift and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’sThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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AllHOPE. Duriez, Cullen, and Manchak (2014) raise the concern that the
ideology driving the diffusion of Project HOPE has emphasized its
“swift and certain” character, ignoring other positive features such as mo-
tivational interviewing training for officers in the program, something
for which there is a strong evidence base (Rubak et al. 2005; Lundahl
et al. 2010), which is why motivational interviewing has become central to
responsive regulation (Braithwaite 2011). The literature reviews of HOPE
can be characterized as somewhere between showing great promise and
being discouraging (Lattimore et al. 2016).6 As with Operation Ceasefire,
they should be redone after some on-the-ground engagement with what
each specific program actually does. They could be coded qualitatively or
quantitatively according to four variables: howmuchdeterrence is involved
(HOPE’s E: “Enforcement”), how much social support there is (HOPE’s
O: “Opportunity”), how dynamically concentrated the deterrence is, and
how dynamically concentrated the support is. Meta-analyses might con-
tribute more to science if they were more theoretically focused on what
they evaluate and less focused on heterogeneous puzzles like HOPE that
are in essence brands.
The second tension between minimally sufficient deterrence and Op-
eration Ceasefire is that an approach that says your gang will be seriously
targeted intensively only if it uses guns challenges the inexorability prin-
ciple. In an enforcement swamping crisis, however, we must confront
the reality that priorities must be set that start where it is most important
to start. In Democratic Republic of Congo, that priority was mass rape
atrocities in which hundreds of women and children were sometimes
raped, murdered, or enslaved into mines (Braithwaite 2012). At least one
peacekeeping commander was effective in reducing this seemingly im-
possible enforcement swamping crisis during the first decade of this cen-
tury, according tomyCongofieldwork.He convinced assembledmilitant
leaders that the next militant group to commit a mass rape atrocity would
be the group on which peacekeepers would focus all their military capa-
bilities to bring perpetrators to trial. In myCongo fieldwork trips early in
this decade, I reproached the head of MONUSCO, the military com-6 Lattimore et al. (2016, p. 1103) describe the HOPE program they evaluated at four
sites as a “program that emphasizes close monitoring; frequent drug testing; and swift, cer-
tain, and fair (SCF) sanctioning. It also reserves scarce treatment resources for those most
in need.”There is not much escalation of support in that description, nor any dynamic dis-
tinctiveness of the deterrence strategy to transcend the limits of static deterrence.
This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Minimally Sufficient Deterrence 99
Allmander, the deputy commander, the general in charge of the relevant
region, and the US ambassador for failure to implement this strategy
against Colonel Cheka of Mai Mai Cheka, allegedly the worst perpetra-
tor of mass rape atrocities, and some others like him.Within a year of the
appearance of publications that discussed this (e.g., Braithwaite 2012),
the United Nations announced a policy shift in the direction of dynamic
concentration of deterrence, though this had nothing to do with the pub-
lications. The consensus of knowledgeable commentators is that this
quickly improved the security of the people of Congo after 2014, particu-
larly through the surrender of theM23 armed group that in 2012 captured
Goma, a strategic city with a population of a million that is now liberated.
In 2017 after almost 3 years of sustained military pressure to force sur-
render to face trial, Cheka turned himself in. That is nomore than sugges-
tive qualitative evidence for dynamic concentration of deterrence from
the least likely case (Eckstein 1975) of probably the world’s most extreme
and persistent enforcement swamping crisis in recent decades.
Gun violence was obviously a good target for Operation Ceasefire. It
produced a wonderful result in reducing shootings and homicide by
more than 30 percent, a result that continued to be supported in more re-
cent work on dynamic concentration of deterrence on US gang violence
(Braga, Apel, and Welsh 2013; Kennedy, Kleiman, and Braga 2017). The
strategy, however, fails the inexorability test of minimally sufficient deter-
rence because inexorability happens only for the particular offense in fo-
cus (usually gun crime). Prioritizing of greatest harm is desirable and
might not deeply threaten inexorability as long as there is a strategy to
move on to clean up one kind of gang crime after another, to move down
to the B-list of gang harms and then a C-list after the A-list of gun homi-
cide harms has been tamed.7 Then a strategy like Operation Ceasefire
perhaps in the long run could pass the inexorability test; likewise with en-
forcement swamping crises with tax shelters that the United States and
Australia have faced in recent decades. Australia learned that it is possible
gradually to raise the bar on tax compliance obligations. This is achieved
by targeting the 10 worst tax compliers each year, a different 10 each year
because last year’s terrible 10 are no longer so terrible this year:7 At times, practitioners speak of A-lists and B-lists in static terms, by e.g. arguing that
police go after an A-list of the most serious offenders for automatic prosecution, putting
only the B-list into an Operation Ceasefire or a deferred prosecution program.
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AllWhen the judgment is made that there is a culture of tax cheating in a
particular market segment, the industry norm revealed in the multi-
variate analysis is still used to target those furthest below the norm
for audit and other compliance tools. But more of them can be
targeted than in other industries. And when they are caught out by the
audit, the bar they are required to reach before they are released from
targeted surveillance can be raised a little higher than the industry
norm. As a result of the worst 10 compliers in the industry moving
from way below the old norm to above it, the norm of course is moved
upwards. Then in the next year, a new set of the worst 10 in the in-
dustry is moved up above that higher norm. This raises the bar again.
We can in this way keep raising the bar with problem industries
until they are paying their fair share. (Braithwaite 2005, p. 160)
Stampedes of the wealthy into tax shelter booms do end, as they did in
Australia in the late 1970s and again around 2000 (Braithwaite 2005).
Cascades of open-air drug markets taking over the great cities, even
the stairs of the New York Public Library, also end, and that contributed
to the downward cascade of homicide inManhattan (Zimring 2011). Con-
sider a brief list of accomplishments in reversing catastrophic cascades.
The ozone hole was substantially closed even though it seemed unstoppa-
ble until the Montreal Protocol started to reverse the cascade into chem-
icals that were widening it (Kuttippurath and Nair 2017). Resources were
provided to developing countries to comply with the Montreal Protocol
after 1987, and there were diplomatic shots across their bows as well, par-
ticularly byUS embassies (Braithwaite andDrahos 2000, pp. 261–67). Per-
haps too late, perhaps not, today we see at least the beginnings of reverse
cascades from coal to solar. President Kennedy predicted a cascade of 15–
25 nuclear powers by the 1970s; yet there are still only the United States,
Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, and
North Korea thanks to civilizing forces in international civil society that
won a 2017Nobel Peace Prize and dogged regulatory inspection in places
like Iraq under the nuclear nonproliferation regime (Braithwaite and
Drahos 2000, p. 318). Interminable civil wars in the places where the worst
wars have cascaded for longest, such as Democratic Republic of Congo,
will also one day reverse to cascades of peace.
The trend in regulatory theory is to conceive ever greater sophistica-
tion in risk assessment and risk management as the main game of how
best to cope with the seemingly impossible challenges of regulatory en-
forcement swamping (Black and Baldwin 2010). Though this is not to-This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Alltally wrong, I suspect we learn most from worst cases like Cambodia af-
ter its multiple cascades of genocidal violence beyond the 1970s. In the
1990s, particularly since 1998, downward cascades of violence began to
spread in Cambodia that Broadhurst, Bouhours, and Bouhours (2015,
2018) described as a dynamic “civilizing process” (Elias 1978; Pinker
2011). Broadhurst and his colleagues document that local police and
UN peacekeepers did useful things to help trigger the reverse cascades.
As they show with Cambodia, as a least likely case (Eckstein 1975), it is
not so much that police were geniuses of risk analysis. Rather they did
something that Malcolm Sparrow (2000) simply describes as pick some
important problems and fix them.
Cambodia was more a matter of return to long-run momentum to-
ward civilizing processes that citizens crave and governments pursue
when they seek legitimacy from citizens and with the international com-
munity. This was combined with police and peacekeepers helping out
with an A-list of violence problems that they helped clean up, eventually
moving on to B- and C-lists. A-list criminality included robbery, homi-
cide, and kidnapping, with cattle theft being high on the B-list because
this can be financially devastating in rural areas. Local police became
quite popular according to Broadhurst and his colleagues and gradually
moved away from putting bullets in the heads of desperados and toward
peacetime policing.
We can learn from local priests in Rwanda who acted like Texas rangers
without even a single bullet in the midst of Rwanda’s cascade of genocide.
The priests stood their ground, stopping the genocide from spreading to
their community through their emotional dominance in insisting that their
church would not stand for this in their village (Klusemann 2012). Other
priests who tried this were hacked down. Together, long-run civilizing
processes helped by dynamic concentrations of sanctions and support
and gradually raising the bar on what kinds of violence are intolerable
eventually can pacify even aCambodia or aRwanda or close an ozone hole.
This can be done without filling prisons.8 Or so I hypothesize.8 Rwanda did fill its prisons with 126,000 charged with participation in its 1995 geno-
cide. Many were children who were raped in prison and died from HIV-AIDS. Many
others were innocents forced to participate after seeing their family members hacked to
death for refusing. Defendants were executed on the judgments of second-year law
students. In the end, that tiny, poor society did not have the capacity to deliver justice
to 126,000 for such serious crimes. Most were released to face traditional gacaca, which
some of the time was somewhat restorative in approach (Clark 2010).
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AllIV. Conversations across the Curriculum of Crimes
Restorative justice principles are useful to a minimally sufficient deter-
rence strategy because defiance (Sherman 1992, 2011) is a critical risk.
Defiance is reduced when communities of care do most of the work.
Nathan Harris found that perceived informal disapproval of those most
loved inside restorative justice conferences, not of criminal justice actors,
does the work of persuading offenders that their crime is shameful, per-
suading them to remorse and repair of the harm to victims and to their
own family (Harris 2001, pp. 157–76). In restorative justice, there is no
need for anyone to invoke the concept of shame or for anyone directly to
shame offenders. Loved ones discussing how concerned they are about the
consequences of the crime, the suffering of victims, and what the family
can do to help repair the harm is theway to elicit remorsewithout defiance.
Motivational interviewing of these loved ones can draw this out.
Conversely, there is evidence that stigmatization (as opposed to reinte-
grative shaming) increases crime in criminal justice processes (Ahmed et al.
2001; Braithwaite, Ahmed, and Braithwaite 2006; Tyler et al. 2007) and in
business regulation (Makkai and Braithwaite 1994; Harris 2017). Stigma-
tized offenders are treated as bad people who have done bad things, while
reintegratively shamed offenders are treated as essentially good people
who have done a bad thing. Stigmatized offenders are cast out from the
community of the law-abiding without paying attention to reintegration
rituals that might have drawn them back into the law-abiding community.
Aversion of stigmatization is critical to an effective package of minimally
sufficient deterrence.
The theory of reintegrative shaming argues that shame is important
to crime control and to problem solving (Leach and Cidam 2015; Spruit
et al. 2016). Societies in which rape is not shameful will have a lot of rape.
Societies in which feminist politics communicates the shamefulness of
rape and domestic violence can enjoy steeply reduced rates of these
crimes, as Pinker’s (2011, pp. 196–201) analyses of declining rates of rape
and domestic violence and growing shamefulness of these crimes in cer-
tain Western societies suggest. Broadhurst, Bouhours, and Bouhours
(2015, pp. 310–13) likewise diagnose repeated surveys in Myanmar since
1996 to show declining domestic violence, growing disapproval of wife
beating, and growing public awareness campaigns about why it is wrong.
Feminist politics is just one kind of engagement around the shamefulness
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AllOne of the virtues of deliberative forms of justice such as restorative
justice is that they increase the active participation of citizens in their de-
mocracy through the judicial branch of governance, through children’s
participation in antibullying programs in schools, and through involve-
ment of environmental activists and fishermen in the regulation of envi-
ronmental crimes. Restorative justice therefore has a role to play in ed-
ucating citizens in the curriculum of crimes and why they are shameful,
through their participation in restorative conversations about the crimes
of their classmates, their neighbors, their family members, and them-
selves.
Existing criminal justice institutions by contrast are overly profession-
alized. One consequence is they provide no space for democratic delib-
eration with the young about why crimes that affect people are wrong
and what should be done about them. Democratic citizens can sit in
the public gallery for criminal trials, but few do; and if they try to par-
ticipate in the conversation about the rights and wrongs of the matter
from the gallery, they are silenced.
Penal populism that increases punitiveness is certainly a risk within
contemporary criminal law jurisprudence (Lacey 2008). Advocacy for
minimally sufficient deterrence, however, is advocacy of quite a radical
transformation of these dysfunctional institutions. Ordinary people are
more punitive than the courts when they read accounts of cases and
sentences in the media. When they read about the rich complexity of
the same case as the judge hears it, they recommend sentences similar
to those of the judge. The more information they have, the less punitive
they are (Doob andRoberts 1983, 1988).When citizens have the chance to
engage directlywith offenders and the complexity of their circumstances in
a restorative conference, their vengefulness reduces even further (Strang
et al. 2013, pp. 40–42), which explains why restorative justice conferences
produce less punitive outcomes on average than does traditional criminal
justice processing (Braithwaite 2002, pp. 146–48).
In sum, the restorative justice component of minimally sufficient de-
terrence calms defiance, helps educate offenders and the entire commu-
nity to the shamefulness of crime and to the curriculum of crimes, while
laying foundations for minimal sufficiency of punishment that can defeat
penal populism’s maximalist politics. A utopian world can be imagined in
which each year 1 percent of the population took responsibility for an
offense in a restorative justice conference conducted by the criminal jus-This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Alltice system, a school, a university, or a workplace. If 10 supporters of
victims or offenders attended each conference, conversations about the
curriculum of crimes would ripple across 10 percent of the population
each year. Because human beings are story-telling animals, we learn
the shamefulness of the curriculum of crimes through participating in,
and retelling, stories of which we are a part. This retelling can do most
of the work of constituting the curriculum of crimes, especially when
newer crimes such as profit shifting by multinational corporations begin
to become transparent. Consciences are formed by operation of “the
criminal law as a moral eye-opener” (Andenaes 1974, pp. 116–17), espe-
cially when shamefulness is suppressed through a politics of domination
with crimes such as torture and sexual and gender-based violence.V. Minimal Sufficiency of General Deterrence
The preceding section was partly about the general deterrence that
arises from citizens talking with one another about why something like
rape or torture is wrong. Reintegrative shaming theory advances the idea
that general deterrence by means of the internalization of shame (antic-
ipated self-shaming rather than shame sanctions) combined with a path
out of shame (Leach and Cidam 2015; Spruit et al. 2016) is more impor-
tant than deterrence by sentences handed down by courts (Ahmed et al.
2001). It is also about the restorative justice political strategy for com-
munity support for a less punitive justice system. Satisfaction with the
justice, with the respect for victim rights, and with the effectiveness of
restorative justice in crime prevention is high (normally over 80 percent)
for citizens who sit in on restorative justice conferences (Braithwaite
2002, pp. 45–71; Wilson, Olaghere, and Kimbrell 2017). Part of the
practical politics of driving punishment down to minimally sufficient de-
terrence is convincing politicians who see restorative justice as a soft op-
tion to sit in on a conference and chat afterward with the participants.
This is important because democratic politics is the key constraint on
whether and how judges or police can use minimally sufficient deter-
rence.
The literature on the consequences of police strikes (Andenaes 1974)
has long persuaded criminologists that crime spikes when deterrence is
taken off the table. The contention of minimally sufficient deterrence is
that courts will have little to do in delivering minimally sufficient general
deterrence if citizens are empowered conversationally about the shame-This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allfulness of the curriculum of crimes (Braithwaite 1989, pp. 77–79). Courts
have to ensure through some form of incapacitation that the community
is protected from modest numbers of people who are a severe danger to
the community. The hypothesis is that minimally sufficient deterrence
will be provided by general deterrence resulting from incapacitation cases,
combined with others in which repeated failures of social support and
moderate deterrents escalate to severe deterrents toward the peak of a
pyramid.
This hypothesis has not been empirically tested, but it is consistent
with the evidence that, as long as deterrence does not fall to zero, in-
creasing average prison terms does not have much effect in reducing
crime (Nagin 2013; Chalfin and McCrary 2017). It seems unlikely that
a society would face crime risks from insufficient passive general deter-
rence if it takes seriously shame management and education about the
curriculum of crimes and if it puts into place a credible peak as a last re-
sort in its pyramid of dynamic deterrence. We cannot completely do
without passive general deterrence, but a minimally sufficient quantum
of it delivered by the model I propose here may be enough to achieve the
limited work general deterrence can do.
My proposals can be accomplished only incrementally; learning through
monitoring is important to reveal any explosion of crime driven by a def-
icit in passive general deterrence (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, pp. 140–
55; Dorf and Sabel 1998). If and when empirical evidence suggested this
was happening, incremental movement could be halted and adjusted to
bolster passive general deterrence. My prediction, however, is that as so-
cieties such as the United States and Russia with imprisonment rates
over 600 per 100,000 reduce their passive general deterrence toward that
of societies such as India, Indonesia, and Japan with imprisonment rates
in the 30s to 40s, passive deterrence deficits will not cause crime waves.
This is suggested by cross-national comparisons of crime that show that
low incarceration societies, many in Asia, often have low crime rates.VI. Conclusion
Inexorability is a core principle of minimally sufficient deterrence: pur-
sue inexorable consistency of detection and disapproval of predatory
crime. This implies fusing the debate on dynamic concentration of de-
terrence with the debate about less prison and more and better police.This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
106 John Braithwaite
AllIndeed, the move away from the nihilism about policing prevalent at the
time of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment is a light on the
hill for criminologists (Nagin, Solow, and Lum 2015). So is the move
away from nihilism about rehabilitation that was prevalent at the time
of “Nothing Works” (Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks 1975). Policing
and rehabilitation are useless only if they are unresponsively deployed.
For example, evidence-based refinement of responsivity of rehabilitation
can improve the menu of options in the pyramid of support in figure 1
(Andrews and Bonta 1998, 2010; Manchak and Cullen 2015). Develop-
mentalists have convincingly shown that social support is important to
crime prevention long before the first offense occurs (Cullen 1994).
This is a vital piece for any integrated theory of crime prevention. My
arguments here on minimally sufficient deterrence are, however, limited
to an integrated strategy of deterrence. Deterrence is far from the most
important element of a sophisticated strategy to protect citizens from
crime.
I have introduced suggestive evidence that an inexorably supportive
firm hand might help in preventing crime, in preventing the collapse of
welfare states that struggle to deter corporate tax evasion, and in addressing
many other challenges of crime control.9 The white-collar crime piece of
this is important because, as Sutherland ([1949] 1983) instructed, any the-
ory of crime that provides an account of crimes of the powerless but not of
crimes of the powerful is troubling, indeed profoundlymisleading. It might
be credible as a theory of something more specific than crime. Moreover,
the dominance of theories in criminology that fail this test means crim-
inology buttresses oppression when it normalizes prisons that hold tiny
proportions of wealthy white criminals.
The evidence adduced in support of minimally sufficient deterrence is
no more than suggestive. It is common for criminological theories to
have something going for them while being wrong in most contexts.
Until minimally sufficient deterrence is subjected to an array of different
kinds of empirical investigations, this may be as true of it as it is of the-
ories of passive deterrence that currently dominate thinking. I have at-
tempted to show that minimally sufficient deterrence has promise as a
strategy for moving from passive to dynamic deterrence because it starts9 For a more developed analysis of the empirical evidence for and against restorative jus-
tice and responsive regulation, see Braithwaite (2016) and more recent meta-analyses by
Wong et al. (2016), Bouffard, Cooper, and Bergseth (2017), and Wilson, Olaghere, and
Kimbrell (2017), all of which show significant, usually moderate, effects of restorative jus-
tice in reducing reoffending.
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Allfrom what we already know about deterrence and defiance, and because
it integrates insights from other relational theories that each enjoy a
body of empirical support. These are theories of social support (Cullen
1994), responsivity (Andrews and Bonta 1998, 2010), responsive regula-
tion (Braithwaite 2008), sharpening the Sword of Damocles (Dunford
1990; Sherman 1992, 2011), dynamic concentration of deterrence
(Kleiman 2009), and shame and pride management (Ahmed et al. 2001)
combined with indirect reciprocity (Berger 2011; Nowak 2012). I have
attempted to explore the imperative, grounded in complexity theory, for
abandoning applied social science that tests specific parsimonious theories
in favor of applying meta-theories, theories about how to organize multi-
ple theories, and meta-strategies, strategies about how to sequence many
strategies.
While minimally sufficient deterrence is based on what we know about
deterrence and defiance, that knowledge base has wide gaps of unknown
knowables and unknowables that are complex or chaotic (Braithwaite
and D’Costa 2018, chap. 12). The future gap-filling research agenda can
be framed under the seven policy principles of minimally sufficient de-
terrence:1. Escalate enforcement. Display intent to progressively escalate a
responsive enforcement pyramid that involves progressive esca-
lation of sanctions for wrongdoing and support for social respon-
sibility.
This has been the heartland research priority of Valerie Braithwaite’s
and my research group since 1980 (e.g., see more than a hundred empir-
ical evaluations of the application of responsive regulation to tax compli-
ance by the Centre for Tax System Integrity: http://ctsi.org.au/; more
broadly, see http://johnbraithwaite.com/responsive-regulation/).
2. Inexorability. Pursue inexorable consistency of detection of pred-
atory crime. Communicate inexorable community commitment
to stick with social support for those struggling with problems
of lawbreaking until the problems are fixed.
Critical research contributions here bring together the established
agenda of measuring the effects of perceived certainty of detection with
perceptions that my supporters will deliver me unconditional support,This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allsticking with my problems until they are fixed. While increasing consis-
tency of detection will increase deterrence, having police be everywhere
at all times risks undermining legitimacy, motivating defiance. Lawrence
Sherman has coined the idea of a sweet spot of intensity of just enough
deterrence through police presence at hot spots. Gibson, Slothower, and
Sherman (2017) found such an optimal sweet spot of minimally suffi-
cient patrol in Merseyside, UK. Though it is well established that inten-
sive patrol at hot spots can reduce crime (Braga, Papachristos, andHureau
2014), Gibson and her colleagues are the first to explore the possibility of
reducing the intensity of hot-spot patrol without increasing crime, perhaps
even reducing it somewhat through optimizing that sweet spot. This work
opens a path to understanding cost-effective, minimally sufficient patrol. us3. Escalate social support. With repeated offending, increase social
support. Even when there is escalation to a last resort of severe
incapacitation, escalate social support further. Keep escalating
social support until desistance is consolidated.Perhaps the most critical research needed here is macrosociological
and macroeconomic work on strategies for sustaining a more credible
welfare state. It may be feasible to be politically effective in struggling
for return to improving the condition of the welfare state.4. Sharpen the Sword of Damocles. Cultivate the perception that
“Trouble hangs inexorably over my head; they want to support
me to avert it.”
Here the “less prison” research agenda shows the kind of work that
illuminates Sword of Damocles possibilities (Sherman 2011). This is il-
lustrated through Slothower et al.’s (2017) West Midlands Police exper-
iment, Offender Management by Turning Point (Deferred Prosecution
with a Plan). Random assignment to deferred prosecution combined
with social support substantially reduced crime harm, reduced the cost
of the justice system, and increased victim satisfaction with outcomes,
when compared with prosecuted cases.
5. Dynamic concentration of deterrence. Focus deterrence on lines
that should never be crossed after an announcement date. ThenThis content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allprogressively lift that line, raising our expectations of socially re-
sponsible citizens.
Research in this tradition led by David Kennedy and Mark Kleiman
has not been linked to evidence-based learning on restorative justice
and responsive business regulation, nor to dynamic concentration expe-
rience of international peacekeepers regulating war zones and negotiat-
ing gang surrenders into peace zones. A more interdisciplinary research
imagination is required to see the complex of strategies, including esca-
lated social support and reconciliation, within which to embed dynamic
concentration of deterrence to increase its effectiveness. Future research
must distinguish static focused deterrence effects from dynamic concen-
tration effects.6. Community engagement. Engage the community with offenders
in widening restorative conversations that educate in the shame-
fulness of criminal predation for the many who participate in the
conversations. Avert stigmatization.
The research required here includes the intersection of work on com-
munity engagement with crime control (e.g., Sampson, Raudenbush,
and Earls 1997; Pratt and Cullen 2005; Odgers et al. 2009) and research
on the Connectedness, Hope, Identity, Meaning, and Empowerment
(CHIME) conclusion by Leamy et al. (2011) in their review of the “re-
covery capital” research tradition (Best 2017). The CHIME conclusion
is that connectedness, hope, identity, meaning, and empowerment are
needed for capacity for recovery from problems such as drug addiction,
alcoholism, suicide attempts, and arrests. It is important to integrate the
best psychological and criminological research on pride and shame dy-
namics and on shame acknowledgment as offenders renarrate their lives
(Leach and Cidam 2015; Spruit et al. 2016).7. Modesty. Settle for the modest general deterrence delivered by
this shamefulness and a minimal number of cases that escalate to-
ward the peak of the enforcement pyramid.
This is the “decrementalist” research strategy recommended by Braith-
waite and Pettit (1990) on republican theory and criminal justice. It means
evaluation research on how low imprisonment can go without crime be-This content downloaded from 128.135.181.078 on October 17, 2018 08:51:11 AM
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Allginning to increase. When we have no choice but to lock up extremely
dangerous people, we can be justifiably pessimistic that this will deter
those specific people when released. Yet others seeing that imprison-
ment does sometimes happen may deliver a modest quantum of general
deterrence of the rest of the population. Braithwaite and Pettit’s (1990)
decrementalist research agenda went nowhere in the 28 years since it
was proposed. No countries have pursued progressive reductions of im-
prisonment rates until empirical evidence emerged that serious crime
problems were the result. This is a measure of how wide the gap is in
every country between minimally sufficient deterrence and criminal jus-
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